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Constitutional Criminal Procedure
by James P. Fleissner
and
Amy C. Reeder**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The field known as "constitutional criminal procedure" is one of the
most dynamic branches of constitutional interpretation. Because most
of the guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments have been
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Bill
of Rights have the effect of creating national minimum standards for
both the federal and state criminal justice systems. Because every year
there are many significant decisions in the field of constitutional
criminal procedure, practitioners need to keep abreast of breaking
developments. Of course, the Supreme Court decides only a handful of
cases in the field each term. In the federalized world of constitutional
criminal procedure, the United States Courts of Appeals are critically
important interpreters of the key constitutional provisions. This Article
surveys significant constitutional criminal procedure decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit handed down
during 1999. In selecting "significant" decisions, we emphasize questions
of first impression and other cases likely to be of interest to criminal
practitioners. In keeping with the traditional format of this Article, we
summarize the selected decisions and offer commentary that we hope
will provide context and highlight the important aspects of the cases.

* Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University,
Macon, Georgia. Marquette University (B.A., 1979); University of Chicago Law School
(J.D., 1986).

** Law Clerk for the Honorable Anthony A. Alaimo, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1997; J.D., 2000).
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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1
Investigatory Stop and Frisk
The Supreme Court has held that brief investigatory seizures of
persons and their effects are permissible if based upon an officer's
reasonable belief that "criminal activity may be afoot."2 This standard,
commonly referred to as "reasonable suspicion," has been referred to as
that "pint-sized version of probable cause required for stop-and-frisk."
The Supreme Court has stated that reasonable suspicion cannot be
precisely defined or reduced to neat legal rules or finely tuned standards
designed for legal technicians.4 Rather, reasonable suspicion is said to
be a commonsense, nontechnical conception meant for reasonable
persons dealing with the practical considerations of everyday life.5
Thus, the requirement of a particularized and objective basis for a
seizure, sometimes termed "reasonable articulable" suspicion, is a fluid
concept that takes its substantive content from the particular context in
which the standard is being applied.6 Once a Terry stop based on
reasonable suspicion begins, the duration of the stop should be limited
to the time "necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."7 However,
the Supreme Court has eschewed any rigid "least intrusive means" test,
observing that a court can almost always conceive of some less intrusive
police action and that such a test would involve courts in "unrealistic
second-guessing."'
The Eleventh Circuit's recent investigatory stop cases illustrate the
fact-sensitive nature of constitutional challenges to a Terry stop. As the
two cases below demonstrate, careful examination of the nuances
surrounding each stop is part and parcel of the legal question of whether
A.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
3. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 414 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 696.
7. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
8. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
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there existed "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
As such, the constitutional limits to investigatory stops are
defined and redefined on a case-by-case basis.
In United States v. Simmons,' ° the Eleventh Circuit held that
detaining a defendant for seventeen to twenty-six minutes longer than
the time required for a "routine" traffic stop was constitutional when the
officers were attempting to ascertain whether defendant was the subject
of an outstanding arrest warrant." In Simmons defendant Bobby Gene
Simmons was pulled over at 6:14 p.m. for failing to stop at a stop
sign. 2 Thus, the initial stop was based on probable cause to believe
Simmons had committed a traffic offense. In Whren v. United States, 3
the Supreme Court stated that under the Fourth Amendment, a decision
to stop a car is reasonable when the police have probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation occurred, regardless of the officer's
subjective motivation for making the stop. 4 Accordingly, after Whren
it is important for the courts to focus on the duration and scope of stops
based on traffic violations when the stop may be a pretext to permit the
officers to act on an ulterior motive.
After Simmons refused to consent to a search of the Pontiac station
wagon he was driving, Officer Frix radioed for a drug-detecting dog and
was told that none were usually available until around 7:00 p.m.'5
While Officer Frix continued to seek a narcotics dog, Officer Rahmings
wrote Simmons a traffic citation and ran a routine
mobile computer
16
check looking for outstanding arrest warrants.
The computer turned up a worthless-check warrant for a "Bobby
Simmons" in Brevard County. The physical description on the warrant

9. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
10. 172 F.3d 775 (l1th Cir. 1999).
11. Id. at 780.
12. Id. at 776.
13. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
14. Id. at 810.
15. 172 F.2d at 776. In a footnote, the court noted that both officers at the scene had
received prior information from two sources implicating Simmons as a drug dealer. They
also had information that a man driving a station wagon similar to the one Simmons was
driving regularly sold drugs in the area. Id. at 777 n.2. The Court refused to reach the
Government's contention that the information regarding possible drug violations
constituted reasonable suspicion justifying the wait for the drug-detecting dog. Id. at 776
n.1. Of course, the use of a drug-detecting dog during the Terry stop justified by the traffic
stop or the attempt to check the "Bobby Simmons" warrant was permissible without any
suspicion of drug activity because a dog sniff is not a search. See United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
16. 172 F.3d at 776-77.
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matched that of defendant, but the birth date was different. The arrest
warrant listed the subject's birth date as October 10, 1957; however,
defendant's date of birth was August 23, 1953, making the subject of the
warrant four years younger than defendant. Because of the discrepancy,
Officer Rahmings attempted to determine whether the Brevard County
warrant was actually for defendant. He radioed in the request and was
put on hold; he used his mobile computer to request a teletype be sent
to Brevard County; and he tried to contact his supervisor for instructions
as to how to proceed. It was not until 7:32 p.m., forty-five minutes after
the original stop, that Brevard County responded to the teletype,
reporting that it had no
further information about the Bobby Simmons
17
listed on the warrant.
While Officer Rahmings continued trying to determine whether the
warrant was actually for defendant, a drug dog was dispatched to the
scene. At approximately 7:00 p.m., the drug dog arrived and alerted on
Simmons's car. The officers searched the car and found thirty small
bags of cocaine under the driver's seat and a loaded handgun beneath a
sheet of paper in the center console. 8
The district court found that the police officers acted diligently in
verifying whether Simmons was the subject of the warrant, and that
there was no undue delay in that endeavor. Further, the district court
found that the police acted diligently in securing the drug dog and that
there was no unreasonable dely in getting the dog to the scene.
However, the district court held that the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion to believe that Simmons was the actual subject of the warrant
and, accordingly, that the stop was an unconstitutional detention. It
reasoned that the distances between where the warrant was issued and
where Simmons was stopped, the differing birth dates, and the fact that
the officers could have arrested Simmons later if the warrant turned out
to be correct, gave rise to insufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion. 9
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was reasonable
suspicion for the continued detention.2" Although the court of appeals
accepted the lower court's factual findings, it concluded that the totality
of the circumstances weighed in favor of reasonable suspicion justifying
the detention.2 ' The court refrained from second guessing 22 officers

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

777.
777-78.
778.
779.
780.
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at the scene, noting that "reasonable suspicion 'does not deal with hard
certainties, but with probabilities.'" 23 The court held that it was legal
for the officers to run the routine computer check for warrants and that
even with the indicia that defendant may not have been the same Bobby
Simmons as the subject of the warrant, it was not unreasonable for the
officers to hold defendant for seventeen to twenty-six minutes to
investigate. 24 The argument that the police officers could have arrested
was quite
Simmons later if the warrant was determined to be for him
25
rightly dismissed by the court as having no basis in law.
The court of appeals concluded that "the length of the delay consumed
in the conduct of the investigative detention must have been 'sufficiently
limited in scope and duration to remain within the bounds' permitted by
Terry."26 The court held that the law enforcement purpose of determining whether Simmons was the subject of the warrant was done in a way
"'that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, and with
a minimum of interference.'"27 Also, it held that the scope and
intrusiveness of the detention was relatively minor because Simmons sat
in his own car during the stop.28

Lastly, the court looked to its own

precedent in United States v. Hardy,29 which held that a fifty-minute
investigative stop was not excessive under the circumstances, and held
the seventeen to twenty-six minutes that it took the officers to check on
the warrant was not an excessively long detention. ° Simmons clearly
demonstrates the potent combination punch provided to law enforcement
by Supreme Court decisions in the areas of pretextual stops based on
traffic violations, the permissible temporal scope of such stops, and the
use of drug-detecting dogs.
In United States v. Pruitt,31 the court confronted another traffic-stop
scenario, but this one was complicated by concerns that the police had
engaged in a form of "racial profiling." 32 In Pruitt the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the convictions of two defendants to the extent that the
convictions turned on an unconstitutional detention and search.33 The

23. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
24. Id. at 779.
25. Id. (stating, "we can discern no valid legal principle or compelling fact requiring"
that the police let Simmons go and arrest him later).
26. Id. at 780 (quoting United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1988).
27.

Id. (quoting Hardy, 855 U.S. at 758).

28. Id.
29. 855 F.2d 753 (11th Cir. 1988).
30. 172 F.3d at 780.
31. 174 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 1221.

33. Id.
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court held the police officer's continuing detention of the two Hispanic
defendants was an unconstitutional "fishing expedition," citing concerns
is unreasonthat this case was another in which "a driver, once stopped,
34
ably detained because of his/her race or national origin."
The stop and search occurred around midnight when Officer Moore
pulled over defendants Pena and Garrido for speeding. The video of the
stop, which was automatically recorded on the officer's videocamera, was
admitted into evidence at trial. It showed the following sequence of
events: Moore asked Pena to get out of the van and told him that he
was speeding. He told Pena to accompany him to the police car so he
could check Pena's driver's license and issue him a speeding ticket.
Once in the car, Moore asked Pena several questions unrelated to the
stop-for example, where Pena's family lives in Memphis. Then the
officer exited the car and went to the van to ask Garrido, who was
sitting in the front passenger seat, for the registration and insurance
papers from the van. While there, he also asked two other passengers
whom they were visiting in Memphis and that street address. Moore
returned to the police car where, instead of completing Pena's ticket, he
asked Pena: who were the three other van passengers; how much he
paid for the van; what kind of work he did; whether Garrido was his
brother; and why they had different last names. Again, failing to write
the ticket, Moore asked Pena if he had anything illegal in the van.
When Pena said "no," Moore asked if he had any weapons, and, again,
time if there were
Pena denied having any. Finally, Moore asked a 3third
5
any drugs in the van, and Pena again said "no."
Next, Moore asked to search Pena's van, and Pena refused to consent.
Moore then told Pena he needed even more time to write the ticket.
Instead of writing the ticket, however, he called in on the radio, "I have
a refusal"-a code phrase indicating the need for a drug dog. While
waiting for the dog to arrive, Moore detained Pena, Garrido, and the
other passengers for more than fifteen minutes while issuing them a
courtesy warning. Nearly thirty minutes after the initial stop, the drug
dog arrived and alerted positively for drugs outside the van. Subsequently, the van was searched, revealing approximately eighty-one
pounds of marijuana."6
The court of appeals first dealt with its own precedent, United States
v. Tapia 3' and consistent Tenth Circuit authority in United States v.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 1217-18.
36. Id. at 1218.
37. 912 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1990).
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Hunnicutt," indicating that under the totality of the circumstances
Officer Moore did not have more than an "inchoate 'hunch"' that
criminal activity was afoot.39 The court recited the familiar standard
that a detention is only permissible if the officer's reasonable-suspicion
determination is objectively reasonable or if the initial detention has
become a consensual encounter.4 ° The court of appeals did not,
however, mention its unwillingness to second guess police determinations made at the scene-a standard relied heavily upon in the Simmons
opinion.
The Eleventh Circuit further relied on the Supreme Court decision in
Knowles v. Iowa.4' In Knowles the Supreme Court invalidated a car
search under the Fourth Amendment and reversed the driver's drug
conviction "because '[o]nce Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued
a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been
obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found
either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of
the car."' 42 Noting that the situation in Pruitt was analogous to
Knowles, the court of appeals held that at the time Pena and Garrido
43
were stopped, all the officer had before him was evidence of speeding.
His questions should have been limited to those necessary to effectuate
The court stated, "In such circumstances,
the traffic citation."
additional 'fishing expedition' questions such as 'What do you do for a
living?' and 'How much money did your van cost?' are simply irrelevant,
and constitute a violation of Terry."45
The court of appeals held that Moore was acting on "an unsupported
hunch instead of a reasonable suspicion." 4 It further stated that
"[alithough [it] resist[ed] the temptation to read an improper motive into
Moore's conduct," it was concerned that this was another case of racial
or national origin discrimination.4' Accordingly, the court reversed the
convictions to the extent that they turned on Moore's unconstitutional
detention and search."

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 1998).
174 F.3d at 1219.
Id. at 1220.
525 U.S. 113 (1998).
174 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118).
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id.
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Taking both Simmons and Pruitt together, it appears that the
Eleventh Circuit is willing to defer to officers' suspicions formulated at
the scene as long as some objective basis exists for them-for example,
the outstanding warrant. However, when the police extend a traffic stop
based on an unparticularized hunch, the court will declare limits on the
scope of the stop, especially when the hunch may be tainted by racial
stereotypes. Outcomes like that in Pruitt are necessary if the Supreme
Court's traffic-stop jurisprudence is to be kept from evolving into an
unlimited license for law enforcement.
B.

Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Standing

United States v. Chaves49 presented the Eleventh Circuit with several
issues surrounding codefendants' reasonable expectations of privacy and
the issuance of warrants based in part on unconstitutionally gathered
information. In Chaves Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
agents, relying on information from a confidential informant, followed
defendant Chaves as he drove a van provided for him by a DEA
informant and designated for use in picking up and delivering drugs.
Chaves went first to a warehouse and then to a restaurant. While at the
restaurant, DEA agents looked in the van and saw several boxes that
were not in the van prior to the pick up. The agents arrested Chaves
and searched the van. They seized ten boxes of cocaine, money, and
keys belonging to Chaves.5 °
Shortly after Chaves was taken into custody, defendant Garcia and
another man were arrested at the warehouse. Both men were armed at
the time of their arrest. The door of the warehouse was locked, and the
agents waited outside for about forty-five minutes before conducting a
warrantless sweep of the warehouse lasting approximately five to ten
minutes. While inside the building, agents saw boxes similar to the ones
found in the van. Following the sweep an affidavit was drafted on
information gathered both before and as a result of the warrantless
entry. The agents obtained and executed a search warrant for the
warehouse. They found four hundred kilograms of cocaine, packaging
material, boxes, gloves, and items belonging to Chaves. Chaves and
Garcia were tried and convicted on drug and firearm charges.51
The court of appeals was presented with two issues regarding
First, the court
defendants' reasonable expectations of privacy.
examined whether Garcia had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

49.
50.
51.

169 F.3d 687 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 689.
Id. at 688-89.
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van Chaves drove.52 The court found that Garcia advanced no facts to
support an expectation of privacy other than a claim that the contraband
in the van belonged to him. 3 It held that simply being aggrieved by
an illegal search of a third-person's property does not give rise to an
infringement of Fourth Amendment rights absent a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the thing searched." The district court had
considered Garcia's claim under the rubric of standing, but the court of
appeals properly analyzed the issue according to the Supreme Court's
modern approach, which merges the concept of standing into the inquiry
about whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the place or vehicle searched.5 5
The Eleventh Circuit also applied the modern approach to the district
court's finding that Chaves lacked standing, holding that Chaves,
because of his "connection" to the warehouse, did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy there even though he did not own it."s It noted
that a defendant could demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy
by demonstrating "'"anunrestricted right of occupancy or custody and
control of the premises as distinguished from occasional presence on the
premises as a mere guest or invitee."'" 57 The circumstances led the
court to conclude that Chaves was more than an invitee and was closer
to one who maintained both custody and control of the warehouse."
He had the only key, giving him the control to exclude others, and he
kept his personal and business papers in the warehouse.59 The court
found these facts sufficient to provide a reasonable expectation of
privacy.6°
The court of appeals was unpersuaded by the Government's argument
that Chaves lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy because the
warehouse was not his principal place of business."' The court noted
that the Fourth Amendment does not limit an individual to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a single place of business. 2 Rather, it extends

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
1984)
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).
Id.
Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d 868,870 (11th Cir.
(quoting United States v. Bachner, 706 F.2d 1121, 1126 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983))).
Id. at 691.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the expectation to multiple locations."3 Furthermore, acknowledging
that there is a lowered expectation of privacy in a business, the court
held that Chaves still maintained an expectation of privacy, thus
implicating the Fourth Amendment."I
The court of appeals then examined whether Chaves's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the warrantless entry of the
warehouse during the so-called "protective sweep." 5 Under Maryland
v. Buie,66 a protective sweep is permissible "when the searching officer
possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on
the arrest scene." 7 This sweep is to protect the safety of the officer
against ambush by persons hiding in a place where a suspect is
arrested. 8 The Eleventh Circuit held that, here, the Government's own
actions undermined the claim that the agents had a protective purpose.69 The officers sat in their cars for forty-five minutes without fear
of ambush.7" Further, the court found no "'specific articulable' facts
that would lead a reasonably prudent officer to believe that ...a sweep
was necessary for protective purposes."7 The officers had no information about the inside of the warehouse at all.72 The fact that Garcia
and the other man were armed did not affect the court's analysis
because the touchstone of the protective-sweep analysis is whether there
are sufficient facts giving rise to suspicion of danger from attack by a
third party, not defendant.73 Thus, the court held the sweep violated
Chaves's Fourth Amendment rights.74
Chaves won the first two legal battles, but lost the war. Like Garcia's
conviction, Chaves's conviction was upheld because the court of appeals
held the search warrant was valid under the independent source
doctrine.75 Under Eleventh Circuit precedent in United States v.
Glinton,76 a search warrant based partly on information acquired as a

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 691-92.
494 U.S. 325 (1990).
Id. at 337.
169 F.3d at 691-92.
Id. at 692.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.

74.

Id.

75.
76.

Id. at 692-93.
154 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1998).
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result of an illegal entry must be supported by other information
sufficient to support a probable cause finding." The court held that
discounting the portion of the affidavit describing information obtained
from the warrantless search, the balance of the affidavit supported a
finding of probable cause."s The combination of the information
provided by the informant, the cocaine found in the previously empty
van, and the seizure of Garcia supported the search warrant.79
Furthermore, the court held the officers were not prompted to seek the
warrant based on what they had seen during the entry.8 ° Of course,
the test for probable cause, like its cousin reasonable suspicion, is a fluid
test that gauges whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
facts are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that contraband will be found.8 1 The court's analysis of the information
in the warrant application not derived from the illegal sweep seems a
straightforward, reasonable application of the test. However, as for the
issue of whether the officers would have obtained the warrant in any
event, the court simply said it could not say otherwise.8 2 The court
based its conclusion on the availability of other probable cause, but it did
not have district court findings or specific facts in the record concerning
whether the agents were prompted to seek the warrant by what they
had seen in the warehouse. The court seems to have finessed this
finding without solid support in the record. A remand for factfinding on
that issue may well have been appropriate.
III.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or

77.

Id. at 1254-55.

78. 169 F.3d at 693.
79. Id.
80. Id. This finding is critical because if the decision to seek the warrant is caused by
the observations made during the illegal entry, the fruit from the warrant would not be
"genuinely independent" of the illegal entry. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533,

542 (1988).
81. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96.

82. 169 F.3d at 693.
83. That action was taken by the Supreme Court in Murray. See 487 U.S. at 543-44.

1100

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.8'
A.

The Right Against Self-Incrimination

The Eleventh Circuit decided two notable cases involving the right
against self-incrimination. In the first of these, United States v. Burgess,8" the court reversed a conviction on the ground that the judge
failed to give a requested "no-adverse-inference" instruction to the
jury." This sort of instruction seeks to reinforce the defendant's right
to remain silent by instructing the jury that it may not draw any
adverse inference from the defendant's exercise of the right to remain
silent. In Burgess the trial court judge omitted a requested no-adverseinference jury instruction, and defense counsel timely objected to its
omission. 7 The judge stated he believed he had given the instruction,
and defense counsel did not press the point any further.8
On appeal the court held the objection was sufficient to preserve the
issue for appeal without further action by the defense attorney, that the
omission was a classic trial error subject to the harmless error standard,
and that the evidence, absent the unconstitutional omission, was
insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 9
The court of appeals held first that defense counsel's objection to the
omission was sufficient.9" In Carter v. Kentucky,9 the Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment requires judges to give a no-adverseinference instruction when requested by defense counsel.92 Further, 18
U.S.C. § 3481 gives defendants the right to receive an instruction that
failure to testify in one's own defense does not create a negative
presumption.9 3 When a court fails to give the requested instruction,
counsel must object with "'precision sufficient to inform the trial judge
as to the matter about which the objection is raised and the grounds
therefor.'" 94 The Eleventh Circuit held defense counsel's objection that
the requested instruction was omitted was sufficient for the court to

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
175 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1264, 1269.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1264-65.
Id. at 1264-69.
Id. at 1265.
450 U.S. 288 (1981).
Id. at 300.
175 F.3d at 1264 n.4.
Id. at 1265 (quoting United States v. Haynes, 573 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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understand the substance of the objection and to give the court a chance
to correct the error before sending the case to the jury.9 5 The court of
appeals also noted that the judge's good-faith belief that the instruction
was given does not excuse the error.9"
The crux of the opinion, however, is the court's discussion of the
appropriate remedy for the omission. The court noted that, since the
9 7 and Chapman v.
Supreme Court's decisions in Arizona v. Fulminante
5
California," the proper analysis for most trial errors is the constitutional harmless error standard." Only major structural defects, such
as total deprivation of the right to counsel, will result in automatic
reversal."° Trial errors occurring during presentation of the case to
the jury may "be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether [they were] harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."1 ' Upon review of the record, the court of appeals
was "not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's
cautionary instruction did not
error in failing to deliver the10 requested
2
contribute to the conviction."

Defendant was on trial for traveling in interstate commerce with
intent to engage in a sexual act with a juvenile in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b). The charge arose from conversations held over the Internet
between defendant and a girl who claimed to be thirteen years old but
who was actually a police officer. Defendant raised the defense of
entrapment and attacked the Government's ability to prove that he
The Eleventh Circuit
actually believed the girl to be underage."
found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to prove both
entrapment and that defendant lacked the necessary mental state to
commit the crime.1°4 At best, the court of appeals found that the

95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
499 U.S. 279 (1991).

98. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
99.
100.
101.

175 F.3d at 1266-67.
499 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 307-08.

102.

175 F.3d at 1267.

103.

175 F.3d at 1263, 1267-68.

"Maggie284," the screen name of the nonexistent

thirteen-year-old, was chatting with defendant between 11 p.m. and midnight on a school
night and at 11:46 a.m. on a school day, times that a thirteen-year-old girl would be
unlikely to be surfing the Internet. Maggie also gave defendant inconsistent information
about herself at different times. Thus, there was evidence that defendant did not in fact
believe Maggie was a young girl. The jury did not resolve this fact in his favor. Id. at
1268-69.
104. Id. at 1268-69.
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evidence against defendant was not "overwhelming." °5
During
deliberations, the jury sent a question to the judge indicating a need for
further instruction on the law of entrapment and stating that they
believed there might be reasonable doubt on that issue.'0 6 Given the
request for further information by the jury and the other possibly
exculpatory evidence in the record, the court held that the doubts of the
jury may have been resolved in favor of defendant if he had testified.'
The court of appeals stated, "It is thus not unreasonable to
imagine that the jurors, not having been instructed to draw no adverse
inference from Burgess's decision not to testify, resolved their doubts
against him because of his failure to take the stand in his own defense." 08 One can easily imagine Burgess coming out the other way.
Defense counsel's failure to press for the jury instruction or correct the
judge's mistaken -impression could have been deemed a waiver.
Furthermore, errors are often found harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, and a court may well not have engaged in the extensive
speculation about the possible effect on the verdict. As a pragmatic
matter, a court may have reached opposite conclusions influenced by a
skepticism that the no-adverse-inference instruction provides a
meaningful protection to defendants. Indeed, the reason Carterleaves
the choice to defendants rather than requiring such an instruction is
that many trial lawyers believe the instruction is counterproductive
because it reminds the jurors that the defendant did not testify.
The court confronted another Fifth Amendment issue in UnitedStates
v. Chastain.'0 9 That decision teaches that counsel must be careful not
to ask questions in the cross-examination of witnesses that allow a
response revealing defendant's invocation of this right because if counsel
opens the door, the witness will be allowed to comment about matters
otherwise inadmissible. In Chastain the Eleventh Circuit held that a
government agent's direct response to defense counsel's questions, which
revealed that defendant invoked his right to remain silent, was
responsive and not "manifestly intended" to be a comment on defendant's
exercise of his privilege and was, therefore, permissible." 0
In Chastaindefense counsel asked the agent whether he had spoken
to defendant during the course of investigating the charged offense. In
response to this question, the agent replied he did not see defendant

105.

Id. at 1268.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1351-52.
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until he went to defendant's attorney's office to take him into custody.
The agent stated that at the time he picked up defendant he was told
not to ask defendant any questions, and he did not."' The Eleventh
Circuit held that under the circumstances these comments were "direct
responses to defense counsel's open-ended question, and cannot be
construed to be 'manifestly intended' to be a comment on [defendant's]
exercise of his privilege . ., and a rational jury could not take it to be
so. " "' As is usually the case, it would have been difficult to establish
that the witness's answer was a gratuitous swipe at defendant's rights.
Absent such facts, any damage from the comment will be dismissed as
a self-inflicted wound.
B.

Due Process: The Prosecution'sDuty to Disclose Evidence

In Wright v. Hopper,13 the Eleventh Circuit held that the State did
not withhold evidence when defense counsel could have discovered it
with reasonable diligence." 4 In Wright defendant was convicted in
Alabama for robbery and murder and sentenced to death. Although
defendant identified four separate pieces of evidence allegedly wrongfully
suppressed by the State, the testimony of Mary Johnson is of note.
Johnson was a witness at the scene who identified a third person other
than defendant in both a photo spread and later in a line-up. The State
indicted the person she identified, but later dismissed the case on the
ground that Johnson had misidentified him. Based on Brady v.
Maryland,"5 defendant argued that the State wrongfully suppressed
this evidence." 6
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate:
"(1) that the Government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant
(including impeachment evidence) ...; (2) that the defendant does not
possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable
diligence ...; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable
evidence ...; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.""'

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1351-52.
169 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 702.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
169 F.3d at 700-02.
Id. at 701 (quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1989)).
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Evidence is material "'only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed' to
the defense, the result of the proceeding
18
would have been different. '
The court of appeals first held that the Government did not suppress
the evidence." 9 Defense counsel testified that he knew of the third
party's indictment for the same crime and that he knew of Johnson's
existence because he put her on the witness list.20 The court noted
that nothing prevented defense counsel from discovering the transcript
of the earlier hearing involving the third party or interviewing Mary
Johnson. 121 The court held that "the State is not required to furnish
a defendant with exculpatory evidence that is fully available through the
exercise of due diligence. " 122 Further, the court held that even if the
State did suppress the evidence, it was not material because it did not
indicate that defendant was not present at the scene of the crime, and
it did not impeach the testimony of witnesses claiming defendant was
the triggerman.'"
Obviously, the court's opinion includes two independent bases for
rejecting defendant's claim. The court's analysis of the suppression issue
is persuasive. The evidence at issue was available, and although the
prosecution did not flag the evidence for the defense, neither did the
Government conceal the evidence. Defense counsel clearly could have
obtained the evidence. Although the court's alternative materiality
analysis was unnecessary to the holding, it is open to question. Would
the court have reached the same conclusion regarding materiality if it
had been established that the prosecution did suppress the evidence?
The evidence would establish that an eyewitness identified someone else
as the perpetrator and that the person identified previously was charged
with the crime. The court concluded, "The defense would have had a
remote chance of convincing the jury that Roberts was involved in the
murders." 24 Of course, to undermine confidence in the outcome, the
issue is whether the suppressed evidence might have caused the jury to
have a reasonable doubt. Had the prosecution actually played a role in
suppressing the evidence, the court's approach to materiality might have
been less generous.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. (quoting United States v. Stewart, 820 F.2d 370, 374 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Id.at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

20001

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1105

C. Sufficiency and Constructive Amendment of Indictments
The sufficiency of an indictment raises Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy issues and Sixth Amendment notice issues. In United States
v. Steele, 2 ' the Eleventh Circuit held an indictment that failed to
specify precise dates, locations, drug amounts, and purchasers of various
illegal prescription drug transactions was sufficient:
An indictment is sufficient "if it: (1) presents the essential elements of
the charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be
defended against, and (3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment
under the indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the same offense." 26
The court further explained that "alleging that an offense occurred
within a judicial district ... is sufficient to describe the location of the
offense."'2 7 Also, "the amount of drugs involved in an offense is not an
element of the offense but rather is a factor to be considered upon
sentencing, and therefore need not be alleged in the indictment." 2 '
In Steele defendant was charged and convicted under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) on four counts of knowingly dispensing controlled substances."2 The court noted that time, location, drug amount, and the name
of the purchaser are not elements of the offenses charged. 30 Further,
although the Government ordinarily specifies the date of the alleged
offense, failure to do so does not always preclude the defendant from
preparing a defense.' 8 ' In some circumstances, referring to a certain
duration of time is sufficient. 132 Here, Steele had records and receipts
of the transactions to which he could refer to specify the dates of the
alleged offenses."3 The Eleventh Circuit stated that it "would have
preferred that the Government provide more precise dates in the four

125. 178 F.3d 1230 (l1th Cir. 1999).
126. Id. at 1233-34 (quoting United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir.
1998) (en banc)).
127. Id. at 1234 n.1.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1232. Count One of the indictment stated, "That from on or about July 1,
1993, and continuously thereafter, up to and including on or about November 2, 1993, in
the Northern District of Florida, . .. Steele, did knowingly and intentionally dispense
hydromorphone hydrochloride, a schedule II controlled substance, commonly known as
Dilaudid, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1)." In the remaining
three counts, other drugs were substituted for Dilaudid as appropriate. Id. at 1232-33.
130. Id. at 1234.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1234-35.
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counts contained in this indictment, [but] the failure to do so did not
preclude Steele from adequately preparing his defense."" 4 Also, the
court held the indictment did not expose Steele to double jeopardy
because "'the court may refer to the entire record of the prior proceeding
and [will] not be bound by the indictment alone.'' 35 Accordingly, the
court concluded the indictment complied with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 3 '
The court's opinion addressed the issues of double jeopardy and notice,
but it does not reflect whether the defense raised, or the record
suggested, the presence of the other problem that lurks in cases in which
substantive offenses are charged as they were in Steele. The substantive
counts of the indictment charged that defendant repeatedly distributed
illegal drugs over a four-month period.'37 In essence, each substantive
count charged more than one violation of the drug distribution statute.
This practice is commonly known as "duplicitous" pleading, or charging
separate offenses in a single count. 3 8 It is sometimes said that
duplicity inures to the benefit of the defendant because individual
substantive counts could have been brought for each violation. But there
is a great danger in duplicity-the defendant may be deprived of his
right to a unanimous verdict. For example, if Steele distributed
Dilaudid every day from July 1 to November 2, the jury should be
instructed that it could convict Steele of the substantive count only if all
twelve jurors unanimously agree that it was proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that all the elements were proved on at least one specific occasion.
In the absence of such an instruction, or a special verdict, there is no
assurance that the jury unanimously agreed to one of the substantive
violations encompassed by the duplicitous count. The court's opinion
contains no indication that duplicity concerns were raised in Steele.
In United States v. Diaz,' 9 the Eleventh Circuit held that a jury
instruction and the judgment that referred to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine, rather than conspiracy to distribute cocaine,

134. Id. at 1235.
135. Id. (quoting United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1995))
(alteration in original).
136. Id.

137. Id. at 1233.
138. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3(c) (2d ed. 1999). The
term "duplicity," which has won acceptance as the term of art for this pleading defect, is

a bit deceptive because a substantive charge may allege multiple violations over a period
of time, as was the case in Steele. "Duplicity" is distinguished from another term of art,
"multiplicity," which refers to charging a single offense in two or more separate counts.
See id.
139. 190 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1999).

20001

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1107

was only a clerical error and not a constructive amendment of the
indictment."4 A constructive amendment occurs when an instruction
provides greater basis for conviction than what was charged in the
indictment."" This situation results in a violation of the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment.4 2 Mere clerical
errors are not constructive amendments so long as they do not prejudice
the defendant in any significant way. 43
In Diaz defendant was charged in the indictment with conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. However, the jury was charged on conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute. The verdict form correctly listed the
offense. The trial court did not specifically give any instructions on the
possession element, and defense counsel made no objection to the
instructions. The error appeared in the record at the sentencing, in the
presentencing report, and in the final judgment. The sentencing
guidelines are the same for both offenses regardless of the possession
element, so the sentence was not affected. 1'
The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the district court to enter judgment in accordance with the indictment. 145 First, the court noted that all the other allegations of error
made by defendant were meritless and that the conviction would stand
but for this error. 146 Second, the court did not find that the jury was
confused by the discrepancy. 47 The jury had the correct verdict form
and were told to follow the indictment. The instruction on conspiracy to
possess was only one of several instructions that largely focused on the
conspiracy element and the credibility of witnesses. Also, the transcript
revealed that neither lawyer misstated the charge to the jury in their
Third, the court reasoned the thrust of the
closing statements."
defense was lack of credibility of the witnesses and not failure of the
Government to prove an element of the crime. 49 Fourth, the court
noted the fact that defense counsel failed to object to the charge. 5 °
Fifth, the court reasoned that given the jury's credibility determinations,
the record indicated defendant was guilty of the offense with which he

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1251, 1253.
at 1251.
at 1252.
at 1251-53.

145. Id. at 1253.
146. Id. at 1252.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.

150. Id. at 1252-53.
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was charged. 1 ' Sixth, the court noted that the sentencing guidelines
were the same for both crimes.'52
The court's last reason for affirming the verdict was perhaps the most
pertinent. This was a conspiracy case. Therefore, the court reasoned,
the element of "possession" is neither here nor there.' To commit the
charged offense, defendant merely needed to agree to distribute; he did
not actually have to distribute the cocaine himself.'
The same would
be true for possession with intent to distribute-all that would be needed
is the agreement and not the actual possession.'55 Therefore, "the
attempt to differentiate between these two crimes from a practical
standpoint is a distinction without a difference." 5 ' Accordingly, the
court held the instruction was not reversible error.5 7 One judge
dissented from these conclusions, despite the concession that the lack of
objection meant the plain error standard applied.'
Under all the
circumstances of the case, the majority position that defendant's right to
grand jury indictment was not abridged appears sound. That said, the
dissenting judge's displeasure with the error committed is understandable-the entire issue was the product of sloppiness and could easily
have been avoided.
IV.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.' 59

A.

The Right to Confrontation
In general, the Supreme Court's modern Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence has produced a correspondence between the traditional
law of hearsay and the defendant's right to confront the witnesses

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

158. Id. at 1259-60 (Cook, J., dissenting).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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against him. If an out-of-court statement is offered for a nonhearsay
purpose, that is, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement, or if the out-of-court statement fits a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception, the Supreme Court has found the statements reliable enough
to pass muster under the Confrontation Clause."6 Despite the general
parallelism of the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence
governing hearsay, lawyers practicing criminal law must pay attention
to confrontation issues. The Eleventh Circuit addressed several of these
161
issues during the survey period. In United States v. Hunerlach,
defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
was violated when the district court judge admitted hearsay statements
made by two out-of-court declarants. Defendant was on trial for tax
evasion, and the hearsay testimony was to prove that two corporations,
on which defendant served as chairman of the board, were dummy
corporations set up to hide money from the Government. An IRS agent
testified that two directors of defendant's corporations admitted having
little involvement with the corporations. The Government argued that
the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and
were, therefore, not hearsay.'6 2 The Eleventh Circuit, however, held
the statements were in fact offered for the truth of the matter asserted
and, therefore, were hearsay under Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence." 6 The court held the testimony had no relevant meaning
other than to establish that the corporations were in fact wholly
controlled by defendant rather than by the directors.'
This conclusion was sound because there does not seem to have been any legitimate
nonhearsay purpose.
The out-of-court statements do not appear to meet any of the many
rules and exceptions that allow out-of-court statements to be admitted
for the truth of the matter asserted. Because the statements were
erroneously admitted in a criminal prosecution, the rules of evidence and
the Confrontation Clause were violated. Erroneously admitted evidence
is subject to harmless error standards, but because such an error is of
constitutional dimensions under the Confrontation Clause, the prosecu-

160. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.89 (2d ed.
1999). While most exceptions found in evidence rules such as the Federal Rules of

Evidence have been held to be "firmly rooted" for Confrontation Clause purposes, several
have not. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990) (holding that a residual
'catchall exception" is not firmly rooted); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125-34 (1999)
(holding that an exception for statements against penal interest is not firmly rooted).
161. 197 F.3d 1059 (lth Cir. 1999).
162. Id. at 1066-67.
163. Id. at 1067.
164. Id.
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tion must demonstrate on appeal that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, rather than the lesser standard applied to nonconsti6 5
tutional errors."
Here, the court of appeals concluded the error was
in fact harmless in light of substantial evidence in the record that
defendant's corporations were not bona fide corporations.'
Although
defendant's conviction for tax evasion was affirmed,' 67 the decision in
Hunerlach is a reminder of the continuing, if limited, role of the
Confrontation Clause in applying the heightened
harmless error
68
standard to erroneously admitted hearsay.
Perhaps the most prominent modem Confrontation Clause doctrine is
the so-called "Bruton doctrine," which holds that the admission of A's
confession to authorities implicating B, at a joint trial of A and B,
infringes on B's confrontation rights. 69 A's voluntary confession is
admissible against A as A's direct admission under the hearsay rules;
however, A's confession does not fall within a traditional hearsay
exception so as to be admissible against B. 7° In Bruton the Supreme
Court held that the jury could not be trusted to follow a jury instruction
limiting consideration of such a confession to A's guilt and that the
decision to offer A's confession would require separate trials or other
remedial measures to protect B's rights. 7 ' It is a bit odd to speak of
denying B's right to confront evidence that is not admissible againstB,
but the modern Bruton doctrine is based on the theory that the jury will
inevitably use A's statement against B, so admission of A's statement in
a joint trial compromises B's right to confrontation.
The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed several Bruton issues. United
States v. Gonzalez'72 provides a virtual primer in the Bruton doctrine.
Gonzalez involved a drug prosecution of five defendants: Buitrago, Diaz,
Santiago, Claudio, and Gonzalez. At trial the Government offered
confessions of two of the defendants, Gonzalez and Buitrago. In its

165. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (holding no reversal of
conviction if Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
166. 197 F.3d at 1067.
167. Id. at 1069.
168. The heightened constitutional error standard was also applied in the cases
involving the Bruton doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 169-208.
169. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
170. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-02 (1994) (rejecting the theory
that a confession implicating another person fits the federal exception for statements
against penal interest); Lilly, 527 U.S. at 125-34 (declaring a confession implicating another
person to be a violation of the Confrontation Clause despite being admissible under
Virginia's exception for statements against penal interest).
171. 391 U.S. at 137; see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-11 (1987).
172. 183 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
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original form, Gonzalez's confession implicated his codefendants, but the
prosecution avoided separate trials by attempting to follow the procedure
of redacting the confession to eliminate references to the codefendants.173 The Supreme Court has held that if a defendant's confession
does not on its face implicate a codefendant, there is no confrontation
violation. 74 However, the courts have wrestled with the issue of when
a redacted statement improperly points to the guilt of a codefendant
when the name of the codefendant is deleted. The most recent Supreme
Court pronouncement on the issue was the 1998 decision in Gray v.
Maryland.'7 5 In Gray the Court held that replacing the codefendants'
names with a blank, a symbol, or the word "deleted" (as in "Me, deleted,
deleted, and deleted") was
insufficient to protect the confrontation rights
176
of the other defendants.

The confession of Gonzalez involved an application of the principles of
Gray. Gonzalez's confession did not refer to his three codefendants by
name, but the prosecutor elicited testimony that the total number of coconspirators was four. In addition, the confession of Gonzalez admitted
at trial included references to a Colombian, including a description that
made it obvious the Colombian was Buitrago. 77 The court held that
admission of the confession in this form was erroneous.' 78 The court
found the form of the deletion "dangerously close" to the type of
redaction found impermissible in Gray: "The rationale underlying the
Supreme Court's decision in Gray requires finding a Bruton violation on
facts such as these, where a redacted confession implicates a precise
number of the confessor's codefendants."7 9 Thus, Buitrago, Santiago,
and Claudio had their confrontation rights violated.
However, the court went on to analyze the question of whether the
error was harmless.'
As stated above, the harmless error standard
for errors of constitutional magnitude is whether the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 ' Because Buitrago also confessed, the
court held the Bruton violation against Buitrago was harmless.8 2 As
for Santiago and Claudio, the court found the other evidence against
them was so thin that the admission of Gonzalez's confession merited

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 1322.
See Marsh, 481 U.S. at 211.
523 U.S. 185 (1998).
Id. at 197.
183 F.3d at 1322.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Id.; see also Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972).
183 F.3d at 1323.
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reversal."s Thus, the court affirmed the convictions of Gonzalez and
Buitrago and reversed the convictions of Santiago and Claudio."s4
In United States v. Taylor,8 5 the Eleventh Circuit held that a
codefendant's redacted statements did not compel the jury to conclude
defendant was a part of a drug conspiracy and, thus, that there was no
Bruton violation." 6 In Taylor defendants Taylor and Scott were tried
jointly for conspiracy to import cocaine, knowingly importing cocaine,
and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Prior to trial, the
Government indicated it was going to offer a secretly taped conversation
between Taylor and an undercover informant. Scott moved to sever the
trial on Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing the taped testimony would
violate his confrontation rights. The district court denied the motion to
sever, but ordered that the tape be redacted to exclude any reference to
Scott. The redacted statement was read into the record at trial. The
judge instructed the jury before the tape was played that it was only to
consider the statement as it related to Taylor's role in charged
crimes.'87
On appeal Scott contended his Sixth Amendment Confrontation rights
were violated when the motion to sever was denied and when the
nontestifying codefendant's statement was published to the jury. Scott
argued the redacted statement inculpated him in violation of Bruton. He
claimed the statement, combined with other evidence in the record,
compelled the jury to find that he was involved in the conspiracy."
The Eleventh Circuit considered a prior opinion, United States v.
Vasquez,18 9 involving whether the use of neutral pronouns in a confession violates Bruton.' The court of appeals held that "the admission
of a co-defendant's statement that contains neutral pronouns does not
violate the Confrontation Clause so long as the statement does not
compel a direct implication of the defendant's guilt."' 9 ' Thus, the
central inquiry in the Eleventh Circuit is whether the statement
compelled the jury to conclude the defendant was a part of the crime.
In Taylor the court held Taylor's statement did not compel the jury to
conclude that Scott was part of the conspiracy. 92 The court noted that

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 1328.
186 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1334.

188. Id. at 1335.
189. 874 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

190. 186 F.3d at 1336.
191.

Id. (citing Vasquez, 874 F.2d at 1518).

192. Id.
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the redacted statement referred to the existence of other participants in
the crime. 93 It further noted, however, that several other people were
involved with the conspiracy and that the statement did not directly
incriminate Scott.' 94 The court held the statement "does nothing more
than corroborate other evidence that showed that other people were
involved in the drug importation scheme besides Taylor." 5 This
reasoning, combined with the facts that the Government did not link the
neutral pronouns in the statement to Scott during closing argument and
that the judge gave appropriate limiting instructions to the jury, led the
court to affirm the conviction of Scott.9'
In contrast to Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v.
Ramirez-Perez 97 that a codefendant's postarrest statement did violate
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.'9 8 In Ramirez-Perez three
defendants were tried and convicted of various methamphetimine
charges. The charges were made as a result of a drug sale to an
undercover Georgia Bureau of Investigation ("GBI") agent. One of the
defendants, Maclavio, challenged his conviction and sought a new trial
on the ground that the court erred in admitting testimony of the GBI
agent relating to inculpatory postarrest statements of a codefendant,
Homero. 19
The evidence showed that on the night of the incident Maclavio waited
in the car with a nine-millimeter gun in a box by his feet. Whether he
actually participated in the larger drug conspiracy turned on whether
Maclavio brought the weapon to protect himself or whether he brought
it in furtherance of the conspiracy in case the deal went bad. At trial
the district court allowed the GBI agent to relate a postarrest statement
by Homero that Maclavio brought the nine-millimeter pistol at Homero's
instruction. The agent testified that Homero told him the pistol was for
protection in case Homero was "ripped off." Maclavio contended this
statement was inculpatory and violated Bruton.200 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed.2 °1
On appeal the Government conceded that the introduction of the
statement by the agent violated Bruton. However, it argued that the
statement was harmless error because all it proved was that Homero

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
166 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1107-08.
Id. at 1108-09.
Id.
Id. at 1109.
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told Maclavio to bring the gun. Because other evidence established that
Maclavio in fact brought the gun to the scene, the Government argued
the statement did not further inculpate Maclavio.2" 2 The Eleventh
Circuit was unpersuaded and held the statement was inculpatory and
was not harmless, although the court did not explicitly discuss application of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applicable to constitutional errors.2 °3
The crux of the court's decision was that without Homero's statement
that he told Maclavio to bring the gun, the jury would have no reason to
infer that Maclavio brought the gun in furtherance of the conspiracy."
Rather, it would be an equally logical inference that Maclavio
brought the gun for his own protection, a lawful reason.2"5 Thus, the
court concluded, without Homero's statement the evidence would have
been in equipoise. °6 The court went so far as to say that without the
unconstitutional statement, the evidence against Maclavio probably
would have been insufficient to warrant a conviction on either of the
narcotics charges.2 °7 The court of appeals vacated Maclavio's convictions on the narcotics charges and remanded the case for a new
trial. °8
Each of the three Bruton cases discussed above, Gonzalez, Taylor,and
Ramirez-Perez, help to illustrate the many difficulties attendant to
protecting the confrontation rights of codefendants in joint trials when
another defendant has confessed. To avoid the significant costs of
separate trials, the Supreme Court has, within hard-to-discern limits,
allowed editing and redacting of statements to alleviate the confrontation problem. Setting aside concerns one may have about the process of
altering evidence for presentation to the finder of fact, it is obvious the
modern Bruton doctrine is a delicate compromise largely dependent on
the very belief about which the Supreme Court was so skeptical in
Bruton-that juries are able to follow an instruction asking that they not
consider one defendant's confession against another defendant.

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1110.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1111.
207. Id. The court's conclusion that without the inadmissible statement the evidence
was insufficient to convict does not prevent a retrial. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33,
42 (1988).
208. 166 F.3d at 1114. The court upheld Maclavio's conviction on the charge of
possession of a firearm by an alien because the Bruton error was harmless as to that count.

Id.
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The Right to a Speedy Trial

As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the constitutional right to a
speedy trial is a paper tiger. Although the right was applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment in the landmark case of
Barker v. Wingo, °9 the Supreme Court declared the right "vague,"
"amorphous," and "slippery" and proceeded to adopt an ad hoc test for
judging the right that merits each of those adjectives.2 1 ° The court
announced a nonexclusive list of four factors that courts should balance
in determining whether the right has been denied and whether dismissal
is the appropriate remedy: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for
delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the
defendant.2" The court explicitly rejected drawing any bright lines,
such as specific time limits or a hard and fast requirement that the right
be asserted, declaring that specific rules "would require the court to
engage in legislative or rulemaking activity."2 12
Because Barker
provided such a limited protection of the right to a speedy trial, Congress
and many state legislatures adopted comprehensive statutory schemes
governing when a case must go to trial. At the federal level, the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974213 established detailed rules that require cases to go
to trial within seventy days, but allow the "speedy trial clock" to be
stopped for a variety of permissible purposes. In federal court, most of
the legal action concerning speedy trial claims is under the regime of the
Speedy Trial Act. The constitutional right described in Barker is only
occasionally litigated and rarely results in relief.
United States v. Register2 14 is illustrative of the flaccid nature of the
constitutional speedy trial right. Defendant Jubal Register argued that
a thirty-eight month delay from his initial indictment to his trial on drug
trafficking charges denied him a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.2 15 Although the court accepted that the delay was presumptively prejudicial under the one-year benchmark applied by many lower
courts, analysis of the Barker factors led to the conclusion that no
constitutional violation occurred. 21' The court noted that the reasons

209. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
210. Id. at 521-22, 530.
211. Id. at 530.
212. Id. at 523.
213. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994).
214. 182 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 1999).
215. Id. at 826-27. Register also argued that the Speedy Trial Act was violated, but
the strict waiver rules under the Act precluded his claim and left him to the vagaries of a
Sixth Amendment claim. Id. at 828.
216. Id. at 827.

1116

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

for the delay were often legitimate and that both the prosecution and the
defense had contributed to the delay.217 The court also pointed out
that Register's assertion of his speedy trial rights was sporadic.218
Despite the presumption of prejudice, the court highlighted the absence
of even a single argument suggesting any prejudice to Jubal Register's
conduct of his defense.21 9
Under these circumstances the court reached a predictable result. If
the speedy trial guarantee is to be more than a paper tiger, the Supreme
Court will have to be willing to give the right more vigor through the
announcement of prophylactic rules or guidelines that would give some
teeth to the constitutional provision. Such judicially created rules to
enforce and define constitutional rights are increasingly out of fashion
and, when they have been created (such as the Miranda rules), under
attack. There seems little hope that the Speedy Trial Clause will be
invigorated in that way.
C. The Right to Counsel
Jubal Register's codefendant, Charles Register, raised a very
interesting right-to-counsel claim. When Charles Register was initially
indicted on drug trafficking charges, the prosecution raised the
possibility that Charles Register's attorney may have been laboring
under a conflict of interest because he had represented several potential
witnesses and continued to represent Jubal Register on several matters
relating to the case. The court held a hearing and explained to Charles
Register the potential conflict of interest. Charles Register waived the
potential conflict, and the court accepted the waiver.22 °
Later, the prosecution obtained a superseding indictment. The
superseding indictment raised the ante regarding the conflict of interest.
The new indictment alleged that as part of defendants' scheme, various
unnamed attorneys assisted defendants in their illegal activity. In light
of these new charges, the Government again moved to disqualify Charles
Register's lawyer, contending that the lawyer (1) continued to represent
Jubal Register in a related state case, (2) was a subject (but not a target)
of the ongoing federal investigation, and (3) was involved in the charged
crimes. This time the court found a conflict of interest and refused to
accept Charles Register's waiver.22 '

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Government obtained yet another superseding indictment. This
new indictment, which displaced the first superseding indictment,
omitted all reference to the unnamed attorneys and their role in the
scheme. On appeal Charles Register argued the Government's evidence
was too tenuous to justify disqualification of his chosen counsel,
especially because he waived the conflict. He also argued that the
Government manufactured the conflict for the purpose of disqualifying
his counsel.222 The Eleventh Circuit was faced with a case requiring
application of the principles set down in Wheat v. United States.22
Wheat established the standards for reviewing a district court's
pretrial decision to disqualify counsel for a potential conflict of interest. 224 That decision balanced two competing values. On one hand
there must be concern about the defendant's choice of counsel. The right
to counsel of one's choice, while not absolute, is entitled to respect. On
the other hand, the district court has an obligation to avoid having an
attorney try a case while under a conflict of interest. The Supreme
Court recognized that even when a defendant waives the potential
conflict, the defendant may well assert a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and that appellate courts have shown a tendency to allow
such claims despite a waiver.225 In balancing these values and
concerns, the Court in Wheat crafted a rule that is very deferential to
the district court's prospective determination of the issue:
The District Court must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner's counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only
by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of serious
potential for conflict. The evaluation of the facts and circumstances of
each case under this standard
must be left primarily to the informed
226
judgment of the trial court.
Applying these principles to the facts in Register, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the district court's disqualification of Charles Register's lawyer
was permissible. 227 Despite the prosecution's about-face regarding the
mention of lawyers as part of the charged scheme, the district court had
a solid basis for finding a potential conflict of interest. 2' At a fullblown adversarial hearing, the district court heard evidence that the
lawyer may well have been involved in defendant's drug-related

222.
223.

Id. at 825-26, 828.
486 U.S. 153 (1988).

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

182 F.3d at 828.
486 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 164.
182 F.3d at 830-34.
Id.
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activities, including evidence from an informant who said that Charles
Register said he paid his lawyer with illegal drugs.229 The district
court also rejected the claim of bad faith by the Government.23 ° Given
the evidence of the conflict, the district court discounted the prosecution's redrafting of the indictment.2

1

Although the prosecution's

actions might be cast as an attempt to deprive Charles Register of his
chosen counsel, the prosecution also had a motive to protect the trial
record against later claims of ineffective assistance that could have
caused a reversal on appeal. In the end, the court of appeals held that
under the principles
of Wheat, Charles Register was not denied his right
232
to counsel.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed another Sixth Amendment right-tocounsel issue in United States v. Gonzalez.233 Gonzalez was the
defendant whose confession created Bruton issues for his three
codefendants, as discussed above. Gonzalez launched an unsuccessful
Sixth Amendment attack on the admissibility of his confession, which
provided the prosecution with very powerful evidence of Gonzalez's guilt.
The day after Gonzalez was arrested, he appeared in state court and was
appointed a defense lawyer. The lawyer filed a "Notice of Defendant's
Invocation of the Right to Counsel."2 4 Under the Supreme Court's
bright-line approach, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached because adversarial judicial proceedings had commenced.
Furthermore, defendant clearly invoked his right, and an attorney-client
relationship had ensued.
Afterward, Gonzalez's wife contacted the investigating agent and told
the agent that Gonzalez wished to speak to the agent immediately. Two
agents subsequently interviewed Gonzalez at the county jail without his
counsel being present or notified. The agents read Gonzalez his
Miranda rights before the interview and obtained a waiver. That
interview resulted in the confession used against Gonzalez at his trial.
Gonzalez moved to suppress the confession, arguing the agents had
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by initiating contact with
him and interviewing him about the charged crime without his counsel
being present.235

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 830-31.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
183 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1323-24.
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The Eleventh Circuit began its discussion by citing to Edwards v.
Arizona,235 a Fifth Amendment case in which the Supreme Court
fashioned a prophylactic rule concerning police contact with a defendant
who invokes his right to counsel after being advised of his Miranda
rights.237 Edwards forbids further police questioning in the absence of
counsel about the subject of the initial interrogation, unless the
defendant initiates further interrogation. 23"
The Supreme Court
grafted this prophylactic rule onto the Sixth Amendment in Michigan v.
Jackson.23 9 Applying Edwards to the facts, the court had little
difficulty in concluding that Gonzalez had initiated the meeting by
having his wife ask the agents to visit him. 2' The court's conclusion
is sound. The Edwards "initiation exception," however, has at least two
potential difficulties. First, although the facts of Gonzalez are straightforward enough, it is easy to see that there will often be a question of
whether a defendant initiates an interrogation. What if the defendant
seeks to meet with law enforcement officials for some limited purpose
and the agents take the opportunity to expand the interview to the
charged crime? The question of whether a defendant initiates the asking
of questions by the agents may involve some subtle distinctions.24 '
Second, there is a tension between the theory behind Edwards and the
application of the defendant-initiation exception. If invocation of the
right to counsel signals that the suspect or defendant wants his counsel
to serve as a medium between him and the state, how can the suspect
or defendant effectively waive the right to counsel without legal advice?
Despite this tension, the exception recognizes that the suspect or
defendant may voluntarily waive the right to counsel after invocation
and that initiation of the interview by the defendant is strong evidence
of the desire to waive.

236. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
237. 183 F.3d at 1324.
238. 451 U.S. at 487.
239. 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). The Eleventh Circuit cited to Edwards, but not to
Jackson. Although not important to the resolution of the scenario in Gonzalez, it should
be remembered that Edwards has less breadth in the Sixth Amendment context than in
the Fifth Amendment context, particularly because the Sixth Amendment is offensespecific. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-80 (1991). Thus, it would have been
permissible to interview Gonzalez about crimes other than the one for which he was
charged without violating the Sixth Amendment. However, if Gonzalez had invoked his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police could not initiate interrogation about crimes
other than the one for which the suspect has invoked his right to counsel, even if Gonzalez
had an opportunity to talk with counsel before the interrogation. See Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U.S. 675, 682-85 (1988); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154 (1990).
240. 183 F.3d at 1324.
241. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983).
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D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The right to counsel must be a right to effective counsel. However,
many practitioners would disagree as to tactics and strategy in the
various situations confronting them. If the standard of effective
representation is set too high, then any sense of finality to the litigation
process would give way to endless cycles of second guessing lawyers'
decisions and retrying cases. If the standard is set too low, then the
right of effective representation is undermined. The Supreme Court has
attempted to reconcile these competing concerns. In the landmark case
of Strickland v. Washington,242 the Supreme Court announced the
standards governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2' The
well-known test has two prongs, both of which must be satisfied. "First,
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient."2 "
This is judged on an objective standard of reasonableness. 245 The
question is whether counsel's performance fell "outside the wide range
of professionally competent assistance."2" In answering this question,
the courts are to be highly deferential to counsel's decisions and strongly
presume that counsel has rendered adequate assistance.247 Second,
the defendant must show prejudice. 248 The court stated, "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
is a probability sufficient to
been different. A reasonable probability
249
undermine confidence in the outcome."

Given this standard, it is not surprising that few claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel succeed. It is also not surprising that ineffectiveassistance claims are more closely scrutinized in death penalty cases
because the stakes are so high. Nor is it surprising that the few
decisions reversing for ineffective assistance often have the tone of
second guessing and speculation as to the effect of counsel's errors on the
jury. Consider the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Collier v. Turpin.25 °
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Id. at 687.
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249. Id. at 694. In context of the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, when the court
has applied the Strickland test, it has been suggested that the term "reasonable
probability" is equivalent to the term "significant possibility." See Strickler v. Greene, 119
S. Ct. 1936, 1957 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting in part).
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In that case defendant sought habeas corpus relief following his
convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and armed robbery,
for which he was sentenced to death. He appealed from a denial of the
writ. On appeal defendant advanced two ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims. First, defendant claimed his lawyers did not effectively
investigate the case and failed to interview certain of his relatives and
friends who could have provided mitigating information. Most of that
information concerned defendant's economic and social environment,
diabetic condition, and related physical and emotional problems. Second,
defendant claimed counsel failed to elicit mitigating information from
the witnesses that were called during the sentencing phase.2 5'
With respect to the claim of ineffective investigation, the court
affirmed the district court's finding that the defense team had not been
ineffective in seeking out additional witnesses.2 52 Among other factors
the district court found that the newly identified witnesses would have
provided mostly cumulative evidence.253 The court of appeals endorsed
the district court's view that the failure to investigate was in part
tactical and that deference to counsel's choice was appropriate. 4 The
court of appeals rejected the claim of ineffective investigation.2 55
However, the court of appeals reversed the district court and ordered
the writ granted as to defendant's death sentence on the ground that
defense counsel were ineffective in presenting the mitigating evidence
they had at hand.256 The court of appeals scrutinized the record of the
sentencing and found defense counsel's examination of the witnesses
terse and incomplete.25 7 The court found that counsel
presented almost none of the readily available evidence of Collier's
background and character that would have led the jury to eschew the
death penalty. Instead of developing an image of Collier ... as a good
family man and a good public citizen, who had a background of poverty
but who had worked hard as a child and as an adult to support his
family and close relatives, counsels' presentation tended to give the
impression that the witnesses knew little or nothing about Collier. In
failing to present any of the available evidence of Collier's upbringing,
his gentle disposition, his record of helping family in times of need,
specific instances of his heroism and compassion, and evidence of his
circumstances at the time of the crimes-including his recent loss of his
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job, his poverty, and his diabetic condition-counsels' performance
brought into question the reliability of the jury's determination that
death was the appropriate sentence.258
Collierpresents a very unusual case because defense counsel apparently
conceded their presentation of the case was deficient. Defense counsel
claimed the judge had issued an off-the-record order restricting their
presentation; however, the court of appeals would have none of it: "We
find that the trial judge was not to blame for counsels' ineffectiveness;
rather [counsel] were." 259 Having found the first prong of the Strickland test satisfied, the court went on to find that Collier suffered the
required prejudice: "[Wie believe that it is at least reasonably probable
that the jury would have returned a sentence other than death."2 "0
Collier is noteworthy at several levels. As a reversal for ineffective
assistance, it is a rarity. Accepting the court's conclusion that the trial
judge was not responsible, a reversal based on shoddy courtroom
presentation of evidence is very unusual given the high measure of
deference usually accorded to lawyers practicing the art of trying cases.
The court's treatment of the claim based on ineffective investigation is
also worthy of comment. Why did the court feel the need to reach the
issue at all? Given the holding regarding the ineffective presentation of
evidence, resolution of the investigation issue was unnecessary. Indeed,
the court declined to resolve one aspect of the inadequate investigation
claim, namely an argument that defense counsel could have obtained
useful expert testimony regarding Collier's mental condition.2 6'
Perhaps the court decided to take the opportunity to reject the investigation claim to make a statement discouraging these sorts of claims.
Obviously, claims of inadequate investigation can almost always be
made, and when new counsel unearths useful evidence, these claims can
be compelling because the new evidence may seem important enough to
have made a difference.262 In finding the investigation to be objectively reasonable, the court did draw a distinction between what is prudent
and appropriate and what is constitutionally compelled.263

258. Id. at 1202.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1204.
261. Id. at 1199 n.19.
262. See, e.g., Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1387-89 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing
the conviction because of inadequate investigation by counsel). Probably more representative of the court's typical response to claims of inadequate investigation are two recent
opinions of the court. See Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1233-44 (11th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance based on inadequate investigation); Glock v.
Moore, 195 F.3d 625, 634-40 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).
263. 177 F.3d at 1200.

